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ABSTRACT 
 
The widely held view is that effective action on climate change requires commitment by 
national governments to international agreements.  Developed nations like Canada and 
Australia continue to fall short in their commitments to emissions reduction targets 
established under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.  Australia refused to ratify its Kyoto 
commitments until 2008 and Canada withdrew its commitment in 2011.  Subnational 
governments in both countries have been active in developing policy responses to climate 
change yet remain largely excluded as serious policy partners in national mitigation and 
adaptation initiatives.  This paper will utilise Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework to 
consider why subnational governments address climate change and the main factors shaping 
their policy choices.  The experiences of the Australian state of Victoria and Canadian 
province of Ontario provide through which to explore the factors contributing to climate 
policy opportunities and constraints faced by subnational governments in these countries.   
 
Key Word: Canada, Australia, Westminster, subnational governments, comparative climate 
change policy 
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This paper will investigate the factors affecting participation of subnational governments in 
climate change policy in Westminster based systems.  In 2008, Australian State and Canadian 
Provincial Premiers met in Adelaide to discuss issues of shared interest, including 
government responses to climate change.  The Premiers claimed that subnational jurisdictions 
were taking a lead role in driving the climate change policy agenda at both the national and 
international level (CAF 2008).  Examples of their initiatives included the Victorian 
Government’s Climate Change Act 2010 that established Australia’s strongest legislated 
emissions reductions targets and Ontario’s Green Economy and Green Energy Act 2009 that 
legislated the most comprehensive and generous feed-in tariffs in North America.  The 
establishment of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol marked a turning point in both countries for 
subnational governments to consider expanding their climate change policies.  There have 
been mixed results and to date, actions have not achieved comprehensive cuts to greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions nor secured national government commitment to more coordinated 
national responses to international efforts (DCCEE 2011, EC 2012).  Despite this experience 
pressure for subnational mitigation and adaptation policies will increase as national 
governments continue to reduce or withdraw their commitment to international climate 
agreements (Pembina 2011, Suzuki 2012, CSIRO 2011).  
 
Academic research on subnational climate policy has largely focused on the activities of 
American state governments.  Rabe’s seminal research on US states provides important 
understandings about policy activity at this level (Rabe 2005).  Burke and Ferguson’s (2010) 
comparison of climate change policies of some US states and Canadian provinces concluded 
that, while some policies were serious, effectiveness tended to be restricted by fragmentation 
and poor coordination.  Conclusions from the American system have limited application for 
the parliamentary systems of provinces/states in Canada and Australia.  Parliamentary 
systems based on Westminster principles operate hierarchically through a ‘strong executive 
with disciplined political parties and neutral public officials’ that is markedly different to the 
divided executive, weak party system and partisan public officials of the USA (Rhodes and 
Wanna 2008: 367).  To address the void in policy research the preoccupation with American 
state governments has created, this paper undertakes a comparative analysis of subnational 
governments in Canada and Australia.  Canada and Australia provide jurisdictions 
sufficiently influenced by Westminster traditions (Robertson 1982) to begin illustrating the 
realities of subnational climate change policy that are currently under-researched.  
Specifically, Canada's Provincial Government of Ontario and Australia's Victorian State 
Government provide optimal case studies.  Current research shows both will be significantly 
impacted by climate change with predictions of higher temperatures and severe weather 
events intensifying in major population centres over the next century (ECO 2010, CSIRO 
2011).  Both have been policy innovators with examples from environment policy including 
Victoria’s Environment Protection Act 1970 and Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights 
1993.  In both cases statutory commissioners have been established to monitor environmental 
impacts of government policy.  Importantly both Ontario and Victoria have established a 
range of climate policies over the last decade:  Victoria was a policy innovator, when 
compared to other Australian states, by establishing a comprehensive environment and 
sustainability approach mixing legislation with incentives but largely failing to achieve its 
objectives; Ontario, while not a climate policy innovator compared to other provinces like 
Quebec and British Columbia, did commit to an electorally popular, economically focused, 
yet fundamentally uncoordinated approach that achieved some of the most significant 
reductions in GHG emissions in Canada.   
 
Subnational government involvement in climate policy raises a number of interesting areas of 
inquiry.  This paper will utilise Kingdon's (2003) Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) to 
consider why subnational governments address climate change and the main factors shaping 
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their policy choices.  These reflections will allow comment on the extent to which 
subnational case studies demonstrate common experience in addressing climate change and 
potential long-term success or otherwise of subnational policy choices in mitigating climate 
change.  Such an approach requires the paper to be divided in to four parts.  The first briefly 
discusses the theoretical framework of Multiple Streams in the context of trends impacting 
Westminster based systems.  The second outlines the subnational context in Canada and 
Australia and the nature of their policy responses to climate change.  The third section uses 
primary and secondary sources to outline case studies of Victoria and Ontario over the 2000 
to 2010 period as a time of heightened public attention on global warming following the 
establishment of the Kyoto Protocol.  The final section of the paper considers the material 
from these case studies in the context of the theoretical perspectives. 
 
Problems, Policies, Politics and Policy Actors 
The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) stresses ambiguity as a fundamental feature of 
contemporary public policy making.  As ambiguity has become a key feature of government 
responses to climate change, the MSF provides a relevant starting point for theoretical 
considerations of the policy process.  Kingdon’s approach builds on the garbage can model 
established by Cohen et al (1972) that sees organisations as ‘organised anarchies’.  One of 
Kingdon’s objectives is to reveal why some items on the policy agenda achieve prominence 
over others (Kingdon 2003).  Policy makers face challenges due to disagreements between 
climate experts on the precise effects of changing concentrations of GHG emissions on global 
weather patterns.  Uncertainty creates aversion to strong action particularly where economic 
interests may be threatened (Millner et al., 2013).  In the context of ambiguity and aversion 
identifying reasons why climate change enters the government policy agenda takes on added 
importance.  Interlinked as they are by the machinations of ‘policy actors’, the MSF’s three 
streams – problems, policies and politics - provide a useful tool for analysing this 
phenomenon.  These streams, though independent, can be ‘coupled’ by chance or design in 
‘policy windows’ which if missed may prevent future emergence on the agenda.  Unlike the 
garbage can model, the MSF is not skeptical about design and management of the policy 
process and respects the significance of institutions in both the policy agenda and decision 
making processes (Padgett 1980).  
 
Kingdon’s (2003) first stream, ‘problems’, investigates why policy actors pay attention to 
specific issues.  Kingdon provides a more thorough analysis of actors’ influence on the policy 
agenda than alternate theories of analysis. These include the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(Sabatier 1988), which restricts its unit of analysis to coalitions of government, and non 
government actors that engage in coordinated activity to promote the common cause they 
want to advance.  Seeking a more nuanced explanation of government policy agendas 
Kingdon’s model suggests problems can come to the attention of policy makers by four 
mechanisms.  Focusing events that highlight a problem and feedback on current initiatives 
that suggests a failure to achieve the original policy goals each provide various indicators to 
governments that reveal a problem exists that warrants policy attention (Kingdon 2003, 113).  
The MSF also suggests any given policy issue has an improved chance of rising in the policy 
agenda if coupled to another pressing pre-existing problem.  Kingdon argues irregularities, 
produced by either empirical evidence or ‘focusing events’ provide ‘windows’ where groups 
or policy entrepreneurs raise awareness of problems and have opportunities to promote 
change.  This final mechanism assumes compelling evidence and/or focusing events create 
productive but often short-lived opportunities in all types of policy settings.  In the context of 
climate policy, extreme weather events can become potential ‘tipping points’ that mobilise 
pressure group action and media attention to convince policy makers a problem has emerged 
that requires policy action (Birkland 1998). 
 
5 
The ‘policies’ stream considers uptake of new policy initiatives. The MSF approach suggests 
policy making involves reconciling conflicting priorities in cross cutting issues (Kingdon 
2003, 143).  For instance, sensitivities within the electorate can stall or stop ideas emerging. 
When related to Westminster-based systems, Kingdon’s stream incorporates the trend 
towards cabinet and the executive wielding greater power in policy choice (Rhodes et al., 
2011).  Moreover, cabinet-based decision making highlights the necessity of colleagues’ 
support for policy initiatives, particularly the leader who can single-handedly thwart ideas.  In 
fact, recent studies suggest a general trend across Westminster-based systems where reasons 
for policy choice have become less transparent, more politicised and managed through central 
agencies (Rhodes et al., 2011).  The ‘wicked’ nature of climate change and other 
environmental policy issues requires the commitment of colleagues and coordination through 
central agencies to effectively mainstream and implement programmes (Lane and Robinson 
2009).  
 
The third MSF stream concerns ‘politics’.  Politics stresses ‘national mood, pressure group 
campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover’ as relevant factors (Zahariadis 1999, 
77).  Kingdon argues changes to the policy agenda usually arise through changes to the 
‘politics’ stream rather than the ‘policies’ stream.  Changes can emerge after elections; a 
change of political leaders can substantially change the policy agenda (Kingdon 2003, 163).  
In determining a course of action on climate change, political leaders can use policy framing 
and labeling as powerful factors in the political context (Rabe 2005).  The ability to frame the 
climate change debate can increase the level of public engagement (Moser 2009). 
Westminster based systems are particularly subject to the ‘politics’ stream as party politics 
dominates policy agendas.  Policy commitments of political parties are critical contextual 
factors that demonstrate attempts to frame issues and appeal to ideology, appease powerful 
interests and maintain broad public support.  The electoral cycle takes on added importance 
in this stream. Elections provide key points for the political implications of alternative policy 
proposals to rise on the agenda.  An alternate analysis tool, the popular ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ approach (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) argues that governments have a default 
preference for policy stability but can be moved to change if a focusing event highlights some 
form of policy failure. Kingdon (2003) too argues opportunities emerge in the form of ‘policy 
windows’, possibly from a focusing event, but he includes new knowledge or stakeholder 
pressure as catalysts for focusing policy makers attention on the need for change.  When in a 
‘policy window’, potential policies are usually adopted if they are technically feasible, 
aligned with the dominant values systems and anticipate future constraints (Oborn et al., 
2011, 327).  In Westminster based systems, election commitments are particularly relevant 
for climate change actions as they establish the parameters of the policy agenda and 
determine priorities for government action.  Such commitments can also restrict government 
opportunities to change either policy focus or the established policy agenda. 
 
Kingdon explains ‘policy entrepreneurs’ link the three streams by bringing policy issues into 
focus on the government agenda.  Entrepreneurs are individuals ‘willing to invest their 
resources in return for future policies they favour’ (Kingdon 2003, 117) and can include 
academics, researchers and think tanks to voluntary sector and private sector leaders to 
government committee staffers and budget analysts to program and policy officers.  The 
appearance of the ‘right entrepreneur at the right time’ who can join the three streams 
together either by chance or design create a ‘policy window’.  Kingdon (2003, 170) finds 
‘windows’ temporary and if missed they may never re-emerge.  Kingdon mentions visible 
and less visible actors.  Visible actors help to get issues on the agenda, establish the policy 
framework and rely on the less visible actors to coordinate and work with the government 
agencies in getting the policies through the government systems.  This is critical for climate 
change, as it requires participation by the majority of agencies in government.  The wicked 
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nature of the problems and the level of commitment require coordination both horizontally 
and vertically in government.  Kingdon helps to finesse the analysis by prioritising the 
various aspects of the key actors involved.  Policy entrepreneurs’ potential to facilitate or 
prevent change in policy has been a source of considerable analysis and debate.  Within 
Westminster systems, cabinet ministers are visible and critical ‘actors’ in the evolution of 
policy.  According to Rhodes and Wanna (2008) cabinet ministers are visible, interventionist 
and accountable.  They are the pre-eminent policy actor and opportunities for other less 
visible public officials to build ‘policy coalitions’ inside and outside government to legitimise 
‘their’ initiatives are limited in parliamentary government.   
 
The likelihood a politician will become a climate change ‘policy entrepreneur’ in strong party 
systems such as Australian and Canada can be largely determined by party political ideology. 
European and US research provides clear evidence of climate change politicisation with the 
polarization of opinion falling along politically partisan lines (McCright & Dunlap 2011, 
Eurobarometer 2009).  Liberal and left of centre political parties with leaders prepared to 
champion a climate agenda increase the possibility of a policy window emerging (Dietz et al., 
2007).  Australian survey research shows ‘progressive’ politicians are more likely to believe 
in climate change and pursue policy action (Fielding et al., 2012).  There are exceptions, with 
British Columbia’s climate policies introduced by the centre/right Liberal Party, but the 
general rule supports a centre/left tendency.  This conclusion does not exclude the potential 
for epistemic communities in placing options for consideration in the ‘policies’ stream, but in 
Westminster based systems the final decision rests with Cabinet and the Premier.  In their 
portfolios, Ministers can utilise their choice of decision-making structures and identify which 
actors will be included in the policy process to change or maintain the status quo.  The 
Premier and Ministers can ensure the utilisation of relevant structures will play a large part in 
determining which actors will be included in the policy process and how their input will be 
incorporated (Edwards 2010).  
 
Subnational Responses: Victorian State Government   
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) led by Steve Bracks won the 1999 Victorian state election 
with a ‘centre-left’ policy agenda including a commitment to promote ecologically 
sustainable development (ALP 1999, 2002).  Climate change and sustainability policy began 
as a response to two issues in the ‘problem’ stream; namely disappointment with the 
managerialist response to environmental issues and the need for a comprehensive long-term 
policy agenda (Adams and Wiseman 2003).  Sustainability and climate change became part 
of a web of efforts by Bracks and the ALP to bring ‘society and the environment back in’ 
which, they argued were neglected under the previous conservative state government’s policy 
(Economou 1999).  Australia’s willingness to sign but refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
boosted public awareness of climate change.  Bracks began trialing policy discussions 
between ministers and social, environmental, business and trade union representatives to 
debate ideas into the ‘policy’ stream for development into the long-term policy agenda.  
These resulted in the comprehensive Growing Victoria Together (2001) (GVT), an 
aspirational 10-year plan based on 10 priority areas.  Climate change priorities included the 
somewhat vague objectives of ‘protecting the environment for future generations’ and 
‘moving to a less greenhouse gas intensive economy over time, including changes to the 
amount and type of energy we use’ (DPC 2001, 14).   
 
In 2002 Bracks allocated responsibility for climate issues to the Minister for Environment 
and Natural Resources as the central ‘policy actor’.  Policy initiative development was 
largely restricted to the Minister’s Department whose consultation process developed the 
Victorian Greenhouse Gas Strategy 2002 (VGGS).  The VGGS sought to establish climate 
initiatives within sustainability and economic agendas, claiming the strategy would move 
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Victoria towards a sustainable greenhouse future without risking the State’s economic 
prosperity (DNRE 2002).  The proposals included amending the state Forestry Rights Act 
providing carbon property rights if an emissions trading scheme was introduced ‘at some 
point in the future’ (DNRE 2002, 92).  The VGGS was also Victoria’s response to the federal 
government’s requirements for GHG emissions reporting to meet international commitments. 
The Australian Government had also established the 20% Mandatory Renewable Energy 
Target in 2000.  Victoria responded by amending planning legislation to facilitate wind 
energy development as the easiest and quickest way to meet the target.  The GVT and VGGS 
both outline further renewable energy objectives.  Bracks also established the Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (DSE), responsible to the Deputy Premier, to help achieve 
the Government’s vision of Victoria as a ‘world leader in sustainability debate and practice’ 
(ALP 2002). 
 
The ‘policy’ and ‘politics’ streams intensified focus on climate change and by 2006 opened a 
‘policy window’ with a heightened sensitivity to environmental issues in metropolitan 
electorates where the Australian Greens Party (Greens) was attracting support.  The ALP’s 
commitment to climate change had been facing critique from the environment movement, 
particularly state subsidies for brown coal (Gladman 2002).  Of particular concern to 
environmentalists was the Hazelwood power station, the single largest GHG emitter in 
Australia, privatised by the previous state government, and reliant on state contracts for coal 
supply.  The government’s response to pressure over Hazelwood provided a number of 
‘politics’ stream responses with the 2006 election commitments it provoked. Prior to the 
November election, Bracks announced substantial climate change policies including the 
Victorian Renewable Energy Target (VRET) which would require electricity retailers to 
purchase 10 per cent of their power from renewable sources by 2016 (Bracks 2006). 
Following a third election win in 2006 Bracks gave responsibility for climate change to the 
Deputy Premier. A new Climate Change Unit (CCU), within the Premier’s Department 
(DPC), would act as less visible ‘policy actors’ to broker ‘greenhouse policy across 
Government and focus on the longer term challenges for our State’ (Bracks 2006).  
Demonstrating the increasing importance of environment and climate change issues in the 
‘politics’ stream, the Greens won sufficient seats in the Upper House to ‘act as a broker 
between the major parties’ (Economou 2008, 643) marking an important point in their 
popularity and environment issues in Victorian politics.  
 
Bracks and Thwaites became important ‘policy entrepreneurs’ at the national level by using 
the resources of the CCU to develop and coordinate a reform agenda aimed at the federal 
‘politics’ stream.  One key focus was to establish bottom up pressure on federal government 
climate change action by establishing an emissions trading scheme (ETS) with GHG 
reduction targets.  This objective was facilitated by the formation of the National Emissions 
Trading Taskforce (NETT) in conjunction with the other state premiers to establish a national 
ETS.  In a clear recognition of the Kyoto Protocol the state governments also considered 
linking their proposal to international schemes as well as using international credits under the 
Clean Development Mechanism.  The Prime Minister responded by establishing his own 
Prime Ministerial Task Group on Emissions Trading in 2007.  The federal ALP recognised 
the political advantage of utilising state efforts in the lead up to the 2007 federal election 
where climate change had become an important issue in both the ‘politics’ and ‘policies’ 
streams.  The work of the NETT contributed to the federal ALP policy commitments and the 
subsequent Garnaut Review to examine establishing a national ETS. 
 
Bracks and Thwaites resigned in July 2007, to be replaced by Treasurer John Brumby.  The 
climate change ‘politics’ and ‘policy’ streams under Brumby were less evident as his policy 
focuses were education, planning, health and public transport (Brumby 2007). Rudd’s ALP 
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election to federal government in December 2007 marked a significant shift in the national 
‘politics stream’ that returned focus to climate policy in Australia.  Rudd ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol and established a Ministerial portfolio of Climate Change to develop the national 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) in 2008.  Brumby requested the CCU begin 
work on policy options for Victoria in the context of the proposed federal scheme.  The 
‘policy’ stream was reflected through appointing a reference group of eminent climate 
change experts to provide the Premier with ‘independent advice on a range of climate change 
issues’ (Brumby 2008).  
 
Victoria’s Commissioner for Environmental Sustainability released its first State of the 
Environment Report in 2008 which concluded ‘significant environmental and economic 
policy changes are required’ to reduce GHG emissions and improve environmental 
sustainability in the state (CES 2008, 22).  The report provided the first comprehensive 
evidence of the government’s poor environment policies and added some weight to 
environment groups’ concerns (The Age 2008).  In January/February 2009 a record heat wave 
and the most destructive bushfires in Victoria’s history provided focusing events as detailed 
in the ‘problems’ stream that raised public awareness to the impacts of climate change on the 
state (Hennessy 2009).  Brumby released the Victorian Climate Change Green Paper in June 
2009 that wedded Victoria’s policy response to the federal CPRS and introduced some of the 
most significant responses for an Australian state to environment and climate concerns in the 
‘policy’ stream.  However, in April 2010 Rudd announced he would delay the introduction of 
a CPRS until 2012.  Consequently the Green Paper proposals, including the partial closing of 
the notorious Hazelwood brown coal power station, would depend on Victoria’s resources 
alone (Main 2010).  
 
Brumby and the ALP faced an election in November 2010 with a strengthening green vote in 
key urban electorates (ABC 2010).  Critique of the government’s environmental record, poor 
urban planning practices, subsidies to brown coal, and community sensitivity to climate 
issues following recent focusing events, coupled the ‘problem’ and ‘political’ streams in the 
lead up to the state election.  Brumby recognised the opportunity and released the Victorian 
Climate Change White Paper – The Action Plan in July 2010 as the basis for election 
commitments (DPC 2010).  The White Paper represented the coming together of the MSF’s 
three streams and opened the climate change policy ‘window’ a second time.  The window 
culminated with Brumby introducing the Climate Change Bill to parliament in July 2009 
announcing the ‘Government was determined to ensure Victoria led the nation on climate 
change action’ (Brumby 2009).  The Parliament passed the Climate Change Act 2010 in 
September establishing Australia’s highest emissions reduction target of 20 per cent below 
2000 levels by 2020.  Other measures included a plan for a staged closure of the Hazelwood 
coal power station through a compensation deal negotiated with its owners.  Environment 
groups felt the legislation represented a ‘far more impressive piece of legislation than early 
drafts’ of the Bill (Walker 2010).  
 
After being in power for over 11 years the ALP narrowly lost the 2010 election (43 to 45 
seats) (DPS 2011).  Again reflecting the reality of the MSF in the Victorian case study, the 
loss closed the climate change policy ‘window’ in Victoria.  The elected centre-right Liberal 
National Coalition Government (Coalition) ran an election campaign of ‘fixing the problems’ 
and responded to a perceived community backlash against potential increases in household 
energy costs alongside climate change policies with negative economic impacts. The most 
significant of the ALP’s climate initiatives were subsequently reversed.  The Coalition also 
abandoned the ALPs emissions reduction target and forewent closing Hazelwood in response 
to pushback from the coal industry and electrical suppliers (Morton 2010, Weller 2011).   
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Interestingly the Greens Party retained their seats in the 2010 election and increased their 
overall vote. Environment groups despaired though at the erosion of state government 
commitment to climate change objectives in the wake of economic priorities.  Environment 
Victoria argued major political parties were not recognising the electorate’s mood as internal 
polling revealed 76 per cent of Victorians agreed the state government had a responsibility to 
reduce GHG emissions.  They argue survey data shows public support, in the ‘politics’ 
stream is strongest for increased availability for renewable energy and the reduction of coal 
fired power stations (EV 2012). Having reached the end of the data collection period, we can 
see that the long term impact of Victoria’s climate policy activity since 1999 has resulted in 
GHG emissions rising chiefly through stationary electricity and transport emissions growing 
by approximately 4 per cent (DSE 2012).  
 
Subnational Responses: Ontario Provincial Government. 
Ontarians’ concern with air quality intensified after increasing smog days in 2002 and a 
major power blackout in 2003.  These became ‘problem stream’ focusing events, inflating 
GHG emissions and electricity supply to major issues in the community.  These events also 
placed climate issues in the ‘politics’ stream as they contributed to major election 
commitments by the centre/centre-left Liberal Party.  Led by Dalton McGuinty in 2003 the 
party policy platform committed to reducing emissions by closing all coal fired power 
stations; expanding renewable sources; and establishing a greenbelt in outer metro areas to 
help counteract urban sprawl (Rowlands 2007, Ontario Liberals 2003).  In 2003 proposals in 
the ‘policy’ stream for the Liberals would see climate change framed as a clean air and health 
issue that required the removal of coal as a source of pollution to prevent smog ‘killing 1,900 
Ontarians per year’ (Ontario Liberals 2003).  The Liberals were tapping into broad public 
opinion in the ‘politics’ stream that supported government action on climate change (EC 
2005).  Clean air made climate change a local issue and therefore more salient for voters 
(Moser 2009).  Since 2003 the issue of air quality in the ‘problem’ stream and the 
commitment to shut coal fired power stations in the ‘policy’ stream that have consistently 
pressured Ontario’s government in to climate change action.  
 
Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and when McGuinty became Premier in 2003 he 
agreed Ontario should contribute to Canada achieving its emissions reductions targets (ECO 
2005). The Ontario Ministry for the Environment (OME) would coordinate and broker 
discussions with relevant ministries and initiate policy development on climate change issues.  
The OME argued the commitment to close coal fired power stations would be Ontario’s most 
significant contribution to the national objectives.  Along with air quality McGuinty 
recognised traffic congestion and transport infrastructure as sensitive ‘problem’ stream issues 
in electorates affected by poor planning and sprawl.  In response, the Government released 
the Ontario Places to Grow Act (2005) which introduced ‘policy stream’ measures to reduce 
traffic congestion and air pollution from the transport sector, the largest source of greenhouse 
emissions in Ontario (EC 2005; Eidelman 2010).  McGuinty was on relatively safe ground 
with these initiatives as public opinion had moved significantly in favour of controlling 
sprawl.  Even traditional beneficiaries of greenfield development, the so called ‘pro-growth 
coalitions’ of local governments, property developers, investment bankers and realtors, 
recognised that public sentiment had shifted away from the negative aspects of sprawl 
(Eidelman 2010).  Despite this recognition the development industry successfully negotiated 
a ‘mix of regulatory and fiscal incentives designed to induce the development industry and its 
related corporate participants in the land market to embrace the new policy’s goals and 
density targets’ (Pond 2009, 251). 
 
The McGuinty government’s early approach to climate change was fragmented and 
uncoordinated and reflected the independent ‘bottom up’ approach within Ontario ministries 
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(Burke and Ferguson 2010).  Each Ministry’s approach suited its purposes and reflected 
Ontario’s Westminster based parliamentary system where individual ministers set policy.  It 
was this fragmented approach that came to the attention of the province’s Environment 
Commissioner (ECO) Gord Miller, who questioned the agencies’ low-key responses.  He 
argued there were no formal processes and procedures in place to develop a coordinated 
climate change strategy and made recommendations for the government to identify a lead 
ministry to undertake the task (ECO 2005).  The fragmented approach contributed to a failure 
in horizontal coordination to link the development of energy, transport, infrastructure and 
planning policy initiatives.  To reconcile conflicting ‘policies’ stream priorities the ECO 
called for greater coordination to avoid some proposals negating the emissions reductions 
benefits of others.  For example environment groups argued the investments in public 
transport initiatives were outweighed by the government’s refusal to join other provinces in 
implementing the Californian fuel efficiency standards for passenger vehicles (Suzuki 2012, 
Partington and Bramley 2010). 
 
The McGuinty government’s election platform in 2007 again committed to the popular 
closure of coal fired power stations, expanding renewable contributions to electricity supply, 
and investing in public transport.  The ECO and prominent environment groups had been 
critical of the government’s slow progress on its 2003 election commitments (ECO 2006).  
To address these ‘politics’ stream issues, the Environment Minister announced the Go Green: 
Ontario’s Action Plan on Climate Change and promised a second term more comprehensive 
approach to climate change (MOE 2007).  The Plan was essentially a compilation of the 
existing initiatives with the addition of greenhouse gas reduction targets to comply with 
Canada’s Kyoto commitment.  The government argued it would meet these targets by 
implementing the measures it had committed to in 2003 including phasing out coal-fired 
power stations, investing in renewable energy, controlling urban sprawl through the Places to 
Grow Act, and by funding public transit projects under the MoveOntario 2020 program.  The 
development of renewable energy, while popular as an alternative to coal, needed careful 
promotion particularly in rural communities. Resistance had attempted to transform energy 
supply as a public health issue to one of economic development with the subsequent threat of 
renewable energy and feed in tariffs to increased costs for power.  In this, Rowlands argues 
the director of the Ontario Sustainable Energy Association (OSEA) played the role of ‘policy 
entrepreneur’ by reducing community resistance with convincing arguments on the economic 
benefits of renewables both in creating new jobs and financial benefits to farmers (Rowlands 
2007, 199-201).  
 
In 2008 ‘politics’ stream changes emerged when George Smitherman became Ontario’s 
Deputy Premier and Minister for Energy and Infrastructure.  Smitherman became the key 
MSF ‘policy entrepreneur’ for promoting green energy and the greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction (Winfield et al, 2010, Yatchew and Baziliauskas 2011).  Smitherman was 
impressed with European policy frameworks that supported green energy as an economic 
development opportunity and those proposed by Ontario’s Green Energy Act Alliance.  He 
took responsibility for the development of policies to promote green energy acting as a 
visible ‘policy entrepreneur’ by coupling energy, economic and climate issues through the 
development of a more comprehensive policy proposal.  Smitherman helped open a policy 
‘window’ for the 2009 Green Energy and Green Economy Act (GEGEA). The Act stressed 
green energy economic benefits, including 50,000 new jobs and a buy local focus benefitting 
local manufacturers.  The significance of this legislation is reflected in the ECO’s observation 
that: ‘If implemented wisely, the GEGEA may be the game-changer Ontario needs to achieve 
more aggressive GHG reduction targets’ (ECO 2010a). McGuinty also established a Climate 
Change Secretariat within the Premier’s Office as a less visible ‘policy actor’ with the task of 
monitoring the implementation of the Go Green Action Plan (GGAP). In reflecting Ontario’s 
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Westminster based traditions the policy initiatives that make up the GGAP were led and 
managed by individual ministries, not by the Secretariat.  The Secretariat’s role was not to 
coordinate but to identify, review and confirm the climate change implications and provide 
an assessment of progress and risks related to these initiatives to senior government decision-
makers, as well as to report on progress and risks for the plan as a whole (personal 
communication, December 2011).  
 
The McGuinty Government reduced emissions without introducing policies unpopular 
enough to lose an election.  This fact alone has provided an important consistency of policy 
approach to climate change in the province since 2003. Overall emissions in Ontario in 2009 
were 18 per cent lower than 2005 and seven per cent below 1990 levels (EC 2012).  These 
considerable reductions were largely the result of changes in both energy supply and process 
changes at the province’s adipic acid production plant.  Electricity and heat generation had a 
52 per cent decrease in emissions between 2007 and 2009 as a result of the closure of coal-
fired power plants, and to a much lesser extent, the impact of the economic recession.  
However, emissions from the road transport continue to be the highest in the province and 
have increased by 27 per cent above 1990 levels and emissions from residential and 
commercial building continue to increase (Suzuki 2012).  Environment groups agree that 
with the passage of the GEGEA, the legislated commitment to close all coal fired power 
stations, combined with new energy efficiency programmes continues to send signals of the 
government’s intention to shift away from fossil fuels for electricity generation (ECO 2010, 
Pembina 2011a).  Ontario’s climate change policies can be seen to reflect the position of the 
other Canadian provinces where there is a need to balance between good policy and good 
politics (Harrison 2012).  
 
While Ontario’s initiatives during the data collection period have been promoted as important 
achievements they reflect a system with a comparatively low dependence on coal as a source 
of power.  Fossil fuels are more expensive energy sources for Ontario compared with hydro 
and nuclear (Pembina 2011).  The contribution of renewables remains contentious as coal-
generated power is being replaced by nuclear power from refurbished plants and by an 
increase of about 5,000 MW of gas-fired generation as a backup source (OAGO 2011).  The 
Auditor General has been critical of the government’s lack of analysis and evidence for 
renewable energy initiatives.  A 2011 report concludes there has been poor planning and 
analysis contributing to limited access of renewable sources to the grid and exaggerated job 
predictions for renewable projects (OAGO 2011).  The ECO and environment groups 
continue to lobby the government for a more comprehensive approach to climate change.  
New ideas in the ‘policy’ stream include the reduction of industry emissions by introducing a 
carbon price and reducing transport sector emissions through tolls and road pricing.  The 
Ontario Green Party, the ECO and environment groups appear to be the only players calling 
the government to account.  Long term, despite the government’s policy efforts, Ontario’s 
GHG emissions are projected to rise during the 2014-2020 period due to the lack of a more 
comprehensive climate change plan and an anticipated shift to natural gas as older nuclear 
plants are retired.  The ECO argued in 2011 that ‘at this time there is no plan, mechanism or 
tools in place which would allow the 2020 emissions reduction target to be met’ (ECO 2011).  
Two years later, the ECO lamented the ‘government’s long-term energy policy could wipe 
out some of the gains that have been made in reducing GHG emissions’ and as a result is 
likely to only achieve 60% of the reductions necessary to meet its 2020 target (ECO 2013, 2).  
 
Comparative Findings 
Applying the MSF has helped explain how and why climate change emerged on to the policy 
agenda in Ontario and Victoria.  In both contexts the emergence of political, economic and 
environmental problems contributed to the combination of Kingdon’s three streams in 
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creating windows of opportunity for policy change.  This comparative analysis led to finding 
four factors that most significantly influence the reality of climate change policy in 
Westminster-based subnational jurisdictions: electoral advantage, the commitment of the 
Premier, institutional arrangements and intergovernmental cooperation.   
 
The importance of politics and recognition of climate change policy as an opportunity for 
electoral advantage was evident.  The case studies’ responses to climate change point to 
political opportunities and threats in the electoral cycle that encouraged Victorian and 
Ontario leaders to pursue climate change action.  In Ontario McGuinty and the Liberals 
recognised the air quality ‘problem’ as a political opportunity in the 2003 election and 
maintained a commitment to reduce smog from coal-fired power stations in three subsequent 
elections. In Victoria Bracks and the ALP recognised establishing the Kyoto Protocol as a 
political opportunity with the subsequent popularity of climate change as an issue for the 
electorate.  Premier Brumby recognised electoral threats from the green vote in key 
electorates in subsequent elections and the political opportunities for Victoria in pursuing a 
green economic agenda within a declining manufacturing base. 
 
In both cases the commitment of the Premier as the key MSF ‘policy entrepreneur’ was vital 
in determining the appearance of climate change on the agenda and driving policy 
development. Fulfillment of election commitments by these subnational governments 
required strong support from the highest political level to advocate for policy action in 
Cabinet.  Without the Premier’s support climate change policy development was difficult or 
impossible.  A comprehensive approach to climate change has not been McGuinty’s concern. 
He argued climate issues were best dealt with at the national and international level, this 
important fact lies behind his avoidance of a comprehensive climate strategy for the province. 
In Victoria, leadership change within the same ruling party, produced a change in policy 
emphasis. Following Bracks, Premier Brumby placed climate change on the agenda only 
when the coupling of the ‘politics’ and ‘problems’ streams provided economic and political 
opportunity.  
 
The cases also highlight the critical importance of ‘political’ stream federal factors and 
institutional arrangements in shaping subnational climate change policy.  In both Canada and 
Australia, Westminster institutions determine the system processes and the key players for 
policy development.  The parliamentary systems and federal arrangements shape the role of 
political parties and the political context. The centralising trend and vertical fiscal imbalance 
in Australia has weakened the financial position of state governments to such an extent that 
the situation is described as the ‘most extreme of any federation in the industrial world’ 
(Twomey & Withers 2007).  This is borne out by the fact that Brumby’s most significant 
policy initiatives were dependent on the federal CPRS to provide financial support.  By 
contrast Canada’s decentralizing tradition established a deferential federal government 
reluctant to intrude into provincial affairs, where governments are less inclined to national 
efforts than to individual and regional approaches to policy solutions (Bakvis et al, 2009).  
 
There is a great deal of evidence that intergovernmental coordination and cooperation are 
crucial to effective policy action in both countries (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2009: Coucherne and 
Allan 2009).  Australian subnational governments argue greater levels of coordination and 
cooperation with the federal government could assist effective climate change mitigation.  
For example the Australian Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 2001 was a critical driver 
of state policy change to support the growth of renewable sources.  In contrast Canadian 
provinces resist federal intervention, for example Ontario’s ‘equivalency agreement’.  
Canadian centralists argue the federal government needs to overcome current deficiencies 
through coordinated legislative initiatives that introduce consistent fiscal measures, such as 
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carbon pricing and taxation applicable to regulate GHG emissions, across all provincial 
jurisdictions (Coucherne and Allan 2009).  They argue there is a constitutionally appropriate 
role for the Canadian government to alleviate concerns relating to economic competitiveness, 
fiscal equity and constitutionality.  In the Canadian system the proliferation of uncoordinated 
and sometimes conflicting provincial and inter-provincial policies relating to climate change 
has contributed to a poor national response to reductions in GHG emissions over the last 
decade (Belanger 2011).  
 
In both cases election campaigns revealed the convergence of the MSF’s three streams to 
bring climate policy to the subnational agenda.  Compston argues ‘we cannot expect 
governments to implement policies that might endanger their prospects of re-election’ (2010, 
107).  While there is no guarantee any government will pursue its election commitments there 
is some evidence, in Ontario at least, that officials and politicians tend to pay more attention 
to election results than other measures of public sentiment in determining policy priorities 
(Petry 2007).  Reductions in GHG emissions in Ontario have emerged largely because 
McGuinty believed he had a mandate strong enough to focus on election commitments to 
close coal fired power stations and reduce urban sprawl (Rowlands 2007, Eidelman 2010).  
Consideration of political threat at the time of an election also plays a role in policy 
commitments.  Such threats came to a head in Victoria with the coupling of the ‘politics’, 
‘policy’ and ‘problem’ streams making climate change a 2010 election issue, pushing the 
need for more serious commitment in the ALP’s policy platform.  Elections also provide 
opportunities for policy advocacy coalitions resistant to climate change initiatives to raise the 
profile of their proposals with political parties and individual politicians.  In both case studies 
the organised interests determined to maintain the status quo used elections as key 
opportunities to promote their agenda.  The transition from ALP to Coalition governments in 
Victoria provides clear evidence of the potential success of aligning with conservative 
political parties to push alterative policies to those promoting mitigation and adaptation.   
 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) identified the importance of public opinion and policy 
discourse to ‘punctuate the equilibrium’ and drive policy formation and change.  Rabe and 
Borick (2009) observe that, in many respects, climate policy development across levels of 
government reveals a general coalescence between public opinion and policy development.  
The case studies reveal that over the 2000-2010 decade Ontarian and Victorian responses to 
climate issues largely reflected public concern over sustainability and climate change as 
Kingdon’s model suggested.  In the latter part of this period international trends witnessed the 
rise of economic interests dominating public focus, particularly since the global financial 
crisis in 2008.  The crisis provided the ideal opportunity for economic interests to argue 
against many climate initiatives designed to reduce emissions and promote renewable energy 
on the basis of increased costs to industry and household expenditure.  The drop in support 
for GHG reduction programs by the Victorian government reflects politics generally in 
systems dominated by political parties. This has not been such a major factor in Ontario 
where the Liberals, in power continuously since 2003, have localised some climate change 
issues and successfully linked them to concerns in the electorate at each election.  In this 
regard they provide a lesson for other governments in a context sensitive to cost factors and a 
declining interest in climate change.   
 
Conclusion 
Victoria and Ontario provide examples of the MSF framework when applied to Westminster 
based systems.  Both carry the legacy of their industrial past based on resource development 
predicated on cheap energy, and industrial development with high GHG emissions.  The data 
reveals that each were flirting with the need for serious climate change action, but were 
unable to strike a balance between the politics of development and sustainability policy 
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issues. Consequently they are essentially working on the fringes of the central problems 
associated with climate change.  In the absence of improved cooperation and coordination 
taking action on climate policy will require a decoupling from a historical paradigm that has 
been extremely successful in generating wealth and economic development (Lee 2011).  
 
Future analysis must examine the diversity of subnational approaches on a broader scale.  As 
evidence of warming increases and possible solutions are identified, subnational governments 
will continue to pursue the political opportunism potential of climate change policy as both a 
domestic and international issue.  Federal parliamentary systems can benefit from their 
inherent potential for policy experimentation.  However, to date Australian and Canadian 
Governments have shown little interest in learning from subnational efforts or involving 
these governments in developing and implementing international agreements on climate 
change.  Subnational governments in both countries have been frustrated and constrained in 
their efforts to establish significant climate change policies.  The evidence from Victoria and 
Ontario presents a mixed view of the opportunities and constraints faced by these 
governments.  While the limitations of industrial legacy may be confining, there can be some 
optimism for policy experimentation even if the best we can hope for is more leaders willing 
to take climate change seriously.  
 
This paper has made two important contributions to the literature.  First, the analysis has 
contributed to the expansion of climate policy research to subnational governments outside 
the US system.   Second, this is the first application of Kingdon’s model to climate change 
policy by subnational governments in parliamentary systems.  The paper’s findings suggest 
the model has considerable explanatory power in identifying why climate change can emerge 
on to the agenda of state and provincial governments in both Canada and Australia.  The 
extension of future research to other Westminster based systems could contribute to 
theoretical extension to finesse the model for wider application.   
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